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Abstract:  This paper examines the contribution of Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) type effects to
inflationary pressures in Ireland. Irish productivity measures are exaggerated by foreign
multinationals engaged in high value-added activities. These measures suggest that high
productivity in the traded sectors explain most of the inflation differential. Using adjusted
measures to account for the multinational effect, shorter-term demand side factors become more
significant in explaining the inflation differential. Domestic fiscal and incomes policies are
therefore an important source of adjustment for the Irish economy within a monetary union.
I INTRODUCTION
T
he start of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), as expected, has
revealed differing growth and inflation patterns between the participating
countries.  Without monetary or exchange policy, adjustment to either
excessive or depressed demand pressures through real exchange rate
adjustment needs to come through other macroeconomic channels. The Irish
economy provides an interesting test case on how an economy in a growth
transition can cope with excess demand pressures in the context of the “one
size fits all” monetary policy.
Economies, like Ireland, that experience strong output growth would
expect some real appreciation of the exchange rate. In a currency union,
nominal appreciation cannot be relied upon so that real exchange rate
appreciation comes about through higher wage growth and inflation than in
competitor countries. Higher productivity in the traded sector of the economy
179is likely to push up prices in the non-traded sectors by allowing real wages to
increase through the well-known Balassa-Samuelson “productivity
hypothesis” (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). 
This paper tries to determine the role of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in
the Irish economy in order to quantify its possible magnitude. This would
allow focus to be placed on the necessary adjustment mechanisms that are
required to ensure that long-run competitiveness is not eroded as real incomes
rise. As a small open regional economy, Irish living standards are ultimately
determined by its ability to be an effective export base for which
competitiveness as captured by the real exchange rate is crucial. 
The next section of the paper presents the macroeconomic performance of
the Irish economy within EMU thus far. In Section III a simple model to
capture the effect of productivity changes on price trends in Ireland is
presented and empirically tested to determine the size of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect. Section IV looks at adjustment mechanisms available
within the Irish economy that draw upon domestic fiscal and incomes policies.
Section V concludes.
II IRISH MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN EMU
The Irish economy has begun life within EMU on the extremes. The
exceptional growth performance over the period 1994-2001, with average real
GDP growth of 8.9 per cent per annum, was magnified in the first three years
of monetary union. As real GDP growth equalled 10.8 per cent and 11.5 per
cent in 1999 and 2000 (see Figure 1) severe capacity constraints were inherent
in the economy. The overheating pressures arising from the excess demand
induced by a weak exchange rate and historically low interest rates focused
attention on how an economy like Ireland can adjust to its trend growth rate. 
Although the Irish economy slowed severely in the latter half of 2001,
trend real GDP growth is estimated to be around 5 per cent (Duffy et al., 2001).
This is based on the prospects for employment and productivity growth. Over
the medium term the Irish economy is still likely to outpace the other
European economies so that overheating pressures remain a concern.
The use of the GDP measure in the Irish case can be potentially
misleading given the extent to which the industrial base of the economy
reflects the large presence of foreign owned multinational corporations
(MNCs). The high profitability of foreign MNCs in Ireland strongly affects
GDP but not so the GNP measure where profits and other capital income to
non-residents in particular are factored out. As Figure 1 outlines although the
growth rates of real GNP in recent times have not been as strong as those of
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standard. The level of GNP accounted for almost 84 per cent of GDP in money
terms in 2001, indicating the extent of profit repatriation out of Ireland.
Figure 1: Real GDP and GNP Growth in Ireland 1987–2001
The large growth rates either in GDP or GNP terms are by far the highest
among the member states within the euro area. The growth in Irish output
over the last few years has been reasonably well balanced between domestic
and foreign demand factors. By 2000, the combination of loose monetary
conditions and significant wage growth boosted by large cuts in personal
taxation meant that domestic factors accounted for over 70 per cent of the
record increase in output. 
Irish consumer price inflation remained surprisingly subdued during
1999, averaging 2.5 per cent on the EU Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
(HICP) measure, before pushing to the top of the euro-zone inflation league
during 2000. The inflation rate peaked at 6 per cent in October 2000. Although
waning slightly in 2001 price pressures have been sustained with the HICP
inflation rate moving above 5 per cent in 2002, see Figure 2. Given the
persistence of price pressures it is more likely domestic demand rather than
temporary external factors that has driven the high HICP inflation rates
observed that over the period 1999-2002. 
The price trends as captured by the Irish Consumer Price Index (CPI) are
probably an inappropriate indicator of domestic overheating pressures for a
small, open economy like Ireland. The small scale of the economy can be
judged by the fact that Irish output forms only about 1 per cent of the total
euro area output. The extreme openness can be captured by the share of
exports and imports in GDP, which was over 176 per cent in 2001. 
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Other broader measures of price movements in the economy show that
prices have been increasing significantly during the rapid growth phase in the
economy in the latter half of the 1990s. The deflators on personal consumption
and GDP averaged 3.5 per cent and 4.1 per cent respectively during the period
1995-2000 while the CPI was much more muted at 2.6 per cent over the same
time frame.
Figure 3: Traded and Non Traded Goods Price Inflation 1999–2001
The change in the aggregate price level masks a striking differential
between traded and non-traded price growth in the last few years.







































2002m05Decomposing the consumption bundle into traded and non-traded
commodities, the strong growth in non-traded goods prices in Ireland is clearly
evident as in Figure 3. 
The same pattern emerges using a decomposition in terms of valued added
in output which classifies the agriculture and industrial sectors as traded and
the remaining sectors, mainly services, as non-traded. Inflation in consumer
goods prices have consistently been found to be externally determined in the
Irish case, see Quinn et al. (1999) for a summary of the evidence, though the
price of non-tradables, like domestically produced services and house prices,
are significantly determined by wages. 
Although traded and non-traded goods price inflation converged in the
later half of 2001 this was in large part due to lower mortgage payments as
interest rates fell. In contrast inflationary pressures in the services sector
remained high throughout 2001 and into 2002, further substantiating the
prominent role of domestic factors in the inflationary process.
Employment having grown by over 50 per cent in a decade has meant that
the Irish economy is close to full employment. On entering EMU, the
unemployment rate was just above 6 per cent and continued to drop to 3.6 per
cent in 2001 before rising above 4.5 per cent during 2002. These rates are at
levels consistent with close to full employment conditions. This performance is
all the more impressive against the backdrop of high labour force growth
during this period resulting from significant net migration and the large
natural increase as the 1970s “baby boom” entered the work force.
The tight labour market meant that nominal wage growth increased
sharply in contrast to the pay trends over the previous decade. The system of
social partnership in place in Ireland since 1987 has meant that centralised
wage agreements between labour, business and government had delivered
moderate nominal wage growth in return for income tax cuts. This has led to
the share of labour in value added declining steadily over a fourteen year
period, as highlighted in Lane (1998). While wage growth has started to rise
significantly since 1999 towards rates around 10 per cent, strong productivity
increases have meant that relative unit labour costs were still extremely
competitive, see Figure 4. 
Despite the European Central Bank (ECB) interest rate rises, monetary
conditions remained very easy in the first few years of EMU as the sustained
depreciation of the euro ensured Ireland remained competitive against the
dollar and sterling zones which together still account for nearly 51 per cent of
Irish imports. The nominal effective exchange rate continued its downward
trajectory since the start of EMU, with the impact on Ireland being more
pronounced than other countries given its larger exposure to non-euro area
regions, see Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate Indices 1999–2001
The current account of the Balance of Payments went into deficit for the
first time in eight years in 2000 reflecting the emergence of overheating
pressures in the domestic economy. There has been a very significant rise in
net factor income outflows from Ireland since 1998. This has increased
significantly the already large divergence between GDP and GNP measures in
Ireland.  
III ESTIMATING THE BALASSA-SAMUELSON EFFECT
The economies with inflation rates above the euro area average tend to be
clustered among those in the periphery that are in the process of convergence
184 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWor undergoing a transition. It is argued that higher relative inflation in these
cases is part of an equilibrium phenomenon reflecting the adjustment of
relative prices rather than an indication that output growth exceeds potential
growth. In this interpretation, rising prices and wages should be of little
concern.
To  determine whether such a sanguine view of the Irish case should be
taken it is important to estimate the magnitude of the Balassa-Samuelson
effect. In the Balassa-Samuelson framework productivity growth in the traded
sector raises the demand for labour pushing up wage costs in all sectors. Since
the non-traded sectors tend to have lower productivity growth, an increase in
their relative prices is required to maintain equilibrium in the labour market.
In the case of higher productivity growth in the tradable sector, a real
exchange rate appreciation is required. 
The extent of real appreciation depends upon relative productivity in the
tradable and non-tradable sectors but also upon the response of the capital-
labour ratio to productivity gains. In the case of perfect capital mobility, real
appreciation is determined entirely by supply side conditions. When capital is
less than perfectly mobile, as in the short term, business cycle impacts
through demand side factors are often important. 
In the Irish case Kenny and McGettigan (1999) and Wright (1994) have
looked at the short-term dynamics of the real exchange rates using PPP as a
long-run error correction mechanism. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) argue
that PPP may be a rather weak model for long-run exchange rates movements
in Ireland. They find that the long-run exchange rate is time varying and
model it on relative output levels, terms of trade and net foreign asset
positions. They find a strong association between real exchange rates and
relative output but little evidence to support terms of trade movements as an
important determinant. The net foreign assets position seems to have a strong
impact but goes contrary to theoretical expectations.
In this paper our focus is to determine the supply side explanation of
inflation differentials through the Balassa-Samuelson effect, so we abstract
from the business cycle and short-run demand factors by focusing on relative
output differentials as captured by relative productivity terms.
The inflation differential depends upon the relative productivity between
the traded and non-traded sectors in Ireland compared to the euro area. The
usual productivity terms relate to total factor productivity (TFP). The
contributions of labour and capital to Irish growth and TFP are outlined in
Table 1 (Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 2000). As indicated above it is important to
distinguish between GDP and GNP in the Irish case due to profit repatriations
by foreign multinationals operating in high technology sectors, such as
computers and pharmaceuticals (Honohan, 2001). 
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1960– 1965– 1970– 1975– 1980– 1985– 1990– 1995–
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00
Labour 0.19 –0.11 0.34 0.89 –0.87 0.59 1.12 2.65
Capital 0.46 1.46 1.54 1.91 1.23 0.72 0.83 2.33
TFP – GDP 3.13 2.78 2.26 1.79 1.13 2.58 2.70 4.30
TFP – GNP 3.20 2.70 2.03 1.26 –0.03 1.97 2.51 3.10
Education 0.96 0.59 0.54 0.43
Adjusted for education:
TFP – GDP 0.17 1.99 2.15 3.87
TFP – GNP –0.99 1.38 1.97 2.66
Source: Fitz Gerald and Kearney (2000).
When allowance is made for the investment in human capital and for
foreign direct investment by using the GNP measure, the growth in TFP in the
period 1995-2000 is 2.5 per cent rather than the 4.3 per cent as the unadjusted
GDP measure would suggest. Productivity growth in Ireland is high but it is
flattered by the very high value added in a number of small sectors
predominated by the foreign multinationals. 
The IMF (1999) used TFP measures to estimate the likely size of the
Balassa-Samuelson effect for Ireland adjusting for this exaggerated
multinational productivity impact. Their approach was to exclude those
sectors where returns, defined as value added minus wages and salaries, were
deemed to be excessive with respect to some arbitrary benchmark. This had
the effect of excluding those firms with extremely high value added where high
measured labour productivity reflects the intangible assets of the firm. Such
assets may include the global operations of multinationals such as R&D,
product development and other “hidden” costs, which do not appear in the
balance sheets of subsidiary operations in Ireland. 
As noted by Honohan (1998) the multinational sector is characterised by a
low share of wages in value added, suggesting that high measured labour
productivity reflect the intangible assets of firms. The IMF estimate that
labour productivity in manufacturing averaged 8.2 per cent over the period
1991-1996 using unadjusted data but equalled 4.1 per cent when key sectors
were removed. The excluded sectors are “homogenised food preparations” and
“other food products” including cola concentrates, “reproduction of recorded
media” including software, “other organic basic chemicals” representing
mainly pharmaceutical products, “pharmaceutical preparations” and “office
machinery and computers”.
The IMF estimated that the inflation differential from the Balassa-
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the euro area average in contrast to the three percentage points that would
prevail using unadjusted data. Likewise, Alesina et al. (2001) estimated the
impact to be of the order of 1.5 percentage points for Ireland. They split the 4.3
per cent TFP for the whole economy into 8 per cent for tradables and 2 per cent
for non-tradables while assuming no difference in euro area productivity
growth. 
Viewing output growth as the combination of productivity plus
employment growth, the Irish story has been as much about spectacular
employment creation as much as high productivity increases. Given the
difficulties using TFP measures for Ireland we follow the Sinn and Reutters
(2001) approach by focusing on labour productivity within the euro area.
Using data between 1987-1995, Sinn and Reutters estimate that the Balassa-
Samuelson effect results in a differential of 2.3 per cent for Ireland over the
euro area average. We extend this analysis into the first years of EMU for 11
of the Euro-12 economies, paying particular attention to the Irish case.
To illustrate these effects some measures of labour productivity and price
inflation are required in terms of traded and non-traded components. To
construct such measures, however, requires some rather subjective
assumptions with regard to which sectors comprise traded and non-traded
output and employment. Table 2 attempts to illustrate the effects of
productivity differentials on prices. Productivity and price differentials are
calculated over the period 1984-1999. 
In columns (1) and (2) labour productivity is calculated, equating the
growth of marginal and average labour productivities. It is found that labour
productivity has grown significantly faster on average in the traded sector in
all countries. In Ireland’s case the productivity differential is the largest at 5.6
per cent as reported in column (5). In contrast the productivity differential is
smallest in Germany at 0.2 per cent. These results are not surprising given the
contrast between the openness of the Irish economy and the large share of
Germany within the overall European economy.
As reported in columns (3) and (4) the growth rates of traded and non-
traded prices sit equally well in terms of the productivity hypothesis. In all
countries the prices of non-traded goods grew faster on average than traded
goods. The difference between traded and non-traded inflation is calculated 
in column (6). Again Germany is an outlier with the inflation differen-
tial only a half per cent, as would be expected from the similarly small
productivity differential. Those countries where the productivity differential 
between the traded and non-traded sectors is largest, Ireland and Finland,
also register the biggest differentials between traded and non-traded goods
price inflation.
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1984-1999
Country Labour Productivity Value Added Prices Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Traded Non Traded Traded Non Traded Productivity* Prices**
Austria 3.8 0.6 1.0 3.0 3.2 2.0
Belgium 3.8 1.0 0.9 3.4 2.8 2.5
Finland 5.9 1.7 1.3 4.4 4.3 3.1
France 3.7 0.8 1.3 3.5 2.9 2.2
Germany 1.2 0.0 1.7 2.2 1.2 0.5
Greece 2.8 –0.1 10.9 13.1 2.9 2.2
Ireland 6.6 1.0 2.3 5.6 5.6 3.3
Adjusted (3.9) (1.3) (2.6)
Italy 3.6 0.8 3.9 6.1 2.8 2.2
Netherlands 1.7 –0.5 0.0 1.9 2.1 1.9
Portugal 4.4 1.4 9.1 10.5 3.0 1.4
Spain 3.0 0.2 3.9 6.5 2.8 2.5
*Traded minus non-traded.
**Non-Traded minus traded.
Notes: In terms of value added the sector of traded goods comprises Agriculture and Industry, the
sector of non-traded goods the remainder. Labour productivity is defined as value added divided
by employment. Due to a lack of data traded and non-traded employment was taken to comprise
Agriculture and Industry and services respectively. The numbers are arithmetic means of the
annual growth rates for the period 1984-1999 with the exception of Ireland and France. In the
case of France the numbers are derived from the period 1984 to 1998. With respect to Ireland the
numbers without parentheses refer to the period 1984 to 2000 where productivity is defined in the
same terms as the other euro area countries. The numbers in parentheses refer to the period 1991-
1999. These adjusted productivity figures are derived from the Census of Industrial Production
excluding certain key sectors as described below. Employment, Nominal Value Added and Real
Value Added are taken from the OECD National Accounts and Annual Labour Force Statistics. In
the case of Ireland data was also taken from the Central Statistics Office Database and Census of
Industrial Production 1999.
However, as discussed earlier productivity in Ireland’s traded sector is
likely to have been flattered by the presence of a small number of
multinationals with extremely high value added. Using data from the Census
of Industrial Production (CIP) 1999, we follow the IMF approach by excluding
certain sectors from measured labour productivity. The results of this exercise
are reported in parentheses in Table 2. As noted by the IMF (1999) this
procedure though arbitrary excludes those sectors where large productivity
growth reflects intangible assets such as global R&D or advertising. The small
share of output that goes to labour in these sectors substantiates this view. 
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To  summarise, Figure 6 plots column (5) against column (6) of Table 2
using the adjusted figures for Ireland. In the context of the currency union
with fixed exchange rates between the member countries the data from Table
2 can be used to get an estimate of the differential in price growth between the
domestic traded and domestic non-traded sectors (∆Π) due to the productivity
differentials (∆prod) between Ireland and the euro area. 
The estimated equation for the euro area using ordinary least squares is
set out below (standard errors in parenthesis). 
∆Π = 0.69  ∆ prod    + 0.25 (1)
(0.25)                   (0.73)
R2 = .45
Using Equation (1) would suggest that for Ireland the estimated 2.6 per
cent productivity differential would be consistent with a 2.1 per cent price
growth differential, in contrast to the 3.3 per cent observed. This suggests that
Balassa-Samuelson effects arising from a convergence process or structural
change within the Irish economy can explain a substantial portion of the
adjustment of non-traded prices but not fully. This result suggests a more
prominent role of domestic factors in the inflationary process.
It is important to note that the value added price deflator for the traded
sector is unlikely to equate to the traded goods component of the Irish
consumer price index (CPI). While the traded goods component in the CPI is
significantly determined by import prices, the value-added traded price
deflators depend substantially upon export price movements. The difference
between the inflation in domestically produced tradables and the tradable
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The inflation rate in the domestically produced tradables, as defined in this
paper, was 2.8 and 4.4 per cent in 1999 and 2002 respectively, the equivalent
inflation rate in the tradable component within the CPI was 2.2 and 4.8 per
cent in the same period.
In Ireland, export prices reflect a relatively small sample of goods given
the predominance of the multinational sector. The short product life cycle in
many of the exporting sectors that predominant in the Irish economy can
result in heavy discounting of export prices. The extent of declining export
prices could also make the terms of trade effect quite a significant
consideration, but we do not capture this impact in our estimation. 
IV ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS WITHIN EMU
The estimate of the Balassa-Samuelson effect when no account is taken of
the role of high value added foreign multinationals would seem to indicate
that domestic short-term factors have a limited role to play in the Irish
inflationary process. When adjustment is made to account for the exaggeration
in productivity, the sanguine view of the broader price and wage developments
within the Irish economy would be altered. Given the small open regional
nature of the economy, the prospect of a significant and rapid turnaround in
the exchange rate could severely hit competitiveness. In addition, the
importance of trade for Irish growth prospects and ultimately living
standards, means that abrupt erosion of competitiveness should be guarded
against when possible.
While the Irish economy is undoubtedly slowing towards its potential
growth rate, overheating pressures still remain. One option is to allow the
economy experience higher inflation leading to a real appreciation in the
exchange rate. This inflation option would restore the economy to a slower
growth rate by eroding competitiveness. The correct choice of option depends
on the source of overheating. The textbook response is that when the source of
the overheating pressure is internally generated by domestic factors, then a
fiscal contraction is required to reduce domestic price pressures. When the
source is external demand then an increase in inflation to restore relative
prices would be appropriate. As the economy loses competitiveness external
demand for exports declines bringing the economy to trend growth, Alesina et
al. (2001). 
At the present juncture there are reasonably balanced contributions to
output growth from both domestic and foreign sources in Ireland. The
standard prescription would suggest that a combination of wage growth and
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and Thom, 2000). The difficulty with this prescription is that while Ireland
may be nearing the end of its convergence transition, it is not yet completed.
Wage growth remains significant as it has been since the start of EMU. The
difficulty is in gauging the extent of wage growth that is necessary to cool
down the economy without wages overshooting with significant losses in
competitiveness (Duffy and Fitz Gerald, 2000).
Domestic policy tools need to be configured to consolidate the gains
achieved during the transition and to alleviate the inevitable bottlenecks that
can emerge in a period of rapid growth. In this sense the EU Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) may be a constraint, particularly for economies in
transition. The main deficiency with the SGP lies in its inability to distinguish
between high and low indebted countries and those with widely different
potential growth rates. Economies in transition may need to reduce
infrastructural deficits so as to alleviate domestic price pressures and enhance
the productive capacity of the economy. Such economies with high potential
growth may be able to build up sizeable deficits while maintaining constant
debt to GDP ratios. Recent proposals call for a “Debt Sustainability Pact” to
work alongside the SGP to allow large deficits when debt levels are below a
sufficient level (Pisani-Ferry, 2002). The implementation of such proposals
would allow transition economies to implement required capital investments
if these entail temporary large budgetary deficits. 
In the current context for Ireland, notwithstanding the slowing of
economic growth, restraining domestic demand whilst increasing the supply
capacity are imperative. The onus on managing domestic demand falls on
budgetary and incomes policy, while specific interventions are required to
boost the economy’s supply capacity. 
V CONCLUSIONS
Given its successful convergence and arrival at a point of inflexion in
terms of its economic growth, Ireland is in a unique position to reflect on the
nature and suitability of the current economic governance within the
European Union, especially for economies in transition. Economies in
transition can expect to have real exchange rate appreciation (De Bruoeck and
Torsten, 2001), significantly coming through productivity lead wage growth
and consumer price inflation. This Balassa-Samuelson effect can be quite
significant but should not lead to complacency in ignoring the role of domestic
policy responses (Fitz Gerald, 2001). 
Designing appropriate adjustment mechanisms to deal with sharp
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wage growth does not overshoot competitive levels. Wage contracts that
include flexibility mechanisms are one important element (Geary, 1996).
Ireland’s social partnership model may offer the opportunity to provide the
necessary flexibility if elements of deferred compensation mechanisms are
included, see McHale (2001). It is clear from the high output growth in Ireland
in the first three years of EMU that stabilising a small open economy within
a currency union is a difficult task. 
The constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact do not
sufficiently cater for economies like Ireland. The emphasis on the deficit
rather than the debt in the SGP fails to account for the long-term
sustainability issue by focusing on short term constraints. This ignores the
important issues for any country’s public finances such as the age
demographics and the economy’s stage of development. The requirement that
economies attempt to keep close to balance or in surplus may require that
infeasibly large safety margins are required for economies that can expect
high output volatility. 
As a small, open regional economy, the safety margin in the Irish case
allows for little room in order to run prudent government deficits to facilitate
public capital investment given the relatively low debt ratio. While the
conditions of the SGP have not been a binding constraint in the first years of
EMU for Ireland, this is unlikely to be the case in coming years. The time to
revisit the conditions of the SGP has come, particularly in the case of
economies in transition, as Ireland continues to be and the imminent
enlargement of the EU will bring forth many more (MacCoille and McCoy,
2002).
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